Foreign Affairs

Two noteworthy articles in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. One noteworthy for its substance, the other for its vacuity.

The more interesting article is called Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked by George Lopez and David Cortright. They point out that lost in all the brouhaha over the question of whether it was reasonable to believe Saddam had WMD is the simple observation that, whatever else may have been the case, we now know for certain that sanctions were actually working effectively. I was a critic of sanctions, and though I didn't think that this war at this time was a wise idea, it did seem to me impossible for the status quo to last for much longer. But given limited resources and what we now know about the costs of regime change and the effectiveness of sanctions, I'm willing to give their argument (that the sanctions regime points to a cost-effective approach to anti-proliferation) a second look. Money grafs:

...[M]issing from the discussion is an equally important question: What went right with U.S. policy toward Iraq between 1990 and 2003? On the way to their misjudgments, it now appears, intelligence agencies and policymakers disregarded considerable evidence of the destruction and deterioriation of Iraq's weapons programs, the result of a successful strategy of containment in place for a dozen years.
...
The adoption of "smart" sanctions in Iraq was a diplomatic triumph for the Bush administration. It was followed a few months later by Iraq's acceptance of renewed inspections and Security Council approval of a tougher monitoring regime in Resolution 1441. Indeed, the Bush administration spent its first two years methodically and effectively rebuilding an international consensus behind containment. By the fall of 2002, it has constructed the core elements of an effective long-term containment system - only to discard this achievement in favor of war.

I'm not prepared to endorse the argument of the article, but it's certainly compelling and provocative.

The other article of note is Chuck Hagel's A Republican Foreign Policy. He lays out seven "principles" for Republican foreign policy, but several seem freighted with empty notions. The seven core principles, taken literally read as follows:

1. [T]he United States must remain committed to leadership in the global economy.
   
2. U.S. foreign policy cannot ignore global energy security.
   
3. The United States' long-term security interests are connected to alliances, coalitions, and international institutions.
   
4. [T]he United States must continue to support democratic and economic reform, especially in the greater Middle East.
   
5. [T]he western hemisphere must be moved to the front burner of U.S. foreign policy.
   
6. [T]he United States must work with its allies to combat poverty and the spread of disease worldwide.
   
7. [T]he importance of strong and imaginative public diplomacy.

It's hard to object to any of these, but Hagel is frustratingly vague on evaluating where we presently stand and how we might measure any progress towards realizing any of these principles. Take principle number 3. The follow-up only asserts how important the U.N. and NATO are. There is no mention of whether we are truly alienated from these allies by Bush's actions or not, and all of Hagel's prescriptions are phrased in a curiously passive voice. He writes: "At times the United States can and must lead, but it would be wise to share the authority for - as well as the burdens, costs, and risks of - such operations with others." Well and good, but no mention is made of how the US might persuade the UN to recognize common goals and interests.

At other instances, the discussion lapses into the truly empty: "The relationship with Mexico, in particular, is as critical as any in U.S. foreign policy." Generally, when something is "critical" we think it is a priority, and thus, it is more critical than "any" other relationship. Perhaps something is co-equal with another critical priority... but then we can state "Mexico is as critical as China." Hagel doesn't state this. He just tells us Mexico's population and the length of its border.

Overall, I'd say the article is disappointingly slippery. It offers little clear-eyed insight into the successes or shortcomings of the current Administration's foreign policy, and without grounding its recommendations in a disciplined analysis of the present state of affairs, it ends up sounding like a long string of cliches and platitudes ("Public diplomacy initiatives require strategic direction.") Certainly I hope our entire foreign policy establishment isn't thinking in such muddle-headed terms...